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Fancy formations 
NATO’s spearhead force, the VJTF,1 is the most recent exam-
ple of NATO seeking to respond with new high-end forma-
tions to the security challenges that it faces in the East since 
the crisis in and around Ukraine, and in the South with its 
ongoing instability. But what if it was just an empty shell? 
What if the Allies were only creating new formations, without 
creating the new capabilities they would need to effectively 
fill these formations? The VJTF is deployable within days, 
ready to fight its way into a theatre – in theory. In practice, 
it was realized by re-labelling troops, rather than by setting 
up capabilities. In fact, soldiers, tanks and rifles to fill them 
were not newly set up, but taken from other formations. 
Indeed, one of NATO’s often-overlooked core problems is that 
the Alliance is facing a growing formation – capability gap. 
Too much attention is paid to the formations, such as the NRF 
or VJTF, while the harder work on increasing capabilities to 
fill these formations is neglected, deliberately or not.
 
Fancy formations have for decades been political and mili-
tary boosters for the Alliance. The famous AMF (Air Mobile 
Force) and the much younger NRF are noticeable examples. 
The intentions behind these initiatives have been twofold: 
First, as political boosters they should make governments 
increase their contributions. Ministers prefer to sign some-
thing new rather than supporting the predecessor’s legacy. 
But this is just to hide the second, decade-old objective: mak-
ing European governments contribute substantial capabili-
ties to NATO’s joint effort. 
If NATO is to live up to its task, that is, guarantee the defence 
of its allies, it has to provide credible capabilities. Otherwise, 
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1 Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.
2 NATO Response Force.
the fancy new formations are simply Potemkin villages. 
This requires homework at the political, military and finan-
cial levels. Given the dire state of allies’ individual defence 
capabilities and the not so positive prospects, it would make 
sense for Europeans to coordinate with each other and plan 
who specializes in what equipment, so that not all countries 
would need to provide everything, but all necessary capabili-
ties would be available if needed. All Europeans recognize – 
at least rhetorically - the necessity of coordination in time of 
tight budgets – known as “Pooling and Sharing” in the con-
text of the EU, and “Smart Defence” in the context of NATO – 
but this recognition has not yet been translated into practice.
NATO’s growing formation – capability gap
Currently, NATO’s new formations only create capabilities 
by reorganising existing capabilities, not by generating new 
ones. Hence, fancy formations do only half of the trick towards 
military power. They are the bones or skeletons, but for mili-
tary power, also muscles, i.e. capabilities, are needed.
NATO’s capabilities all come from the same limited pool. Only 
what nations – and to a marginal extent NATO itself – have, 
can be used. And this pool is shrinking constantly. This dwin-
dling had a first high time right after the Cold War (“peace 
dividend”). The second came with the fiscal crisis in 2008. 
European NATO states lost about 25% of their capabilities 
over the last decade. What is left is often not usable, due to a 
lack of maintenance, and because equipment, such as tanks, 
is simply too old. 
The process of losing European capabilities is far from over 
since the long-term political and military repercussions from 
decisions of the last years are still to come. Most European 
armed forces will continue to shrink as the financial crisis con-
tinues having a devastating and long-term impact on public 
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budgets. As a result, the difference between smaller armies, 
such as Estonia with its 6000 personnel and larger ones, such 
as the 175.000 Germans, increases even more.Today, there 
is a significant military imbalance in Europe: only 8 states 
contribute 80% of all European forces. Vice versa, 80% of the 
states only contribute about one third of the forces: two third 
of EU and NATO countries have forces with less than 40.000 
soldiers, half of the countries offer forces smaller than 30.000 
soldiers, and one third is even below 20.000 soldiers.
What is hidden behind these figures is that due to budget 
constraints, smaller armed forces are forced to specialize in 
a few areas in which they can still afford to make internation-
ally relevant contributions, such as NBC-defence, but without 
coordinating these specializations among them. Large states, 
on the other hand, have reduced their militaries to bonsai 
armies: while a full range of capabilities is still present, the 
quantities are far too small to continue operating unilaterally 
for a longer period of time. In addition, a modernization gap 
appears: Cost pressure prevents the acquisition of new assets 
like tanker and transport aircrafts, which make armies fast, 
agile, battle-ready, and sustainable. 
The issue with reducing defence capabilities is not only that 
an army has less material and troops available. The alarm-
ing development is rather that the capability architecture is 
increasingly affected. This structure - consisting of know-how, 
command and control capacities, and equipment and infra-
structure for operations - has for quite some time now been 
only available if important states jointly provided it. And, step 
by step, the ability to carry out military operations at all, is 
shrinking as capabilities in the areas of communications, logis-
tics, and reconnaissance are increasingly absent, as are the so-
called “niche” capabilities like air defence. In this way, gaps in 
capability and modernisation are also eroding solidarity.
This is mainly a European problem; the US though also faced 
with cuts, still play in a higher league of military power. Moreo-
ver, as the US defence budget is shrinking, the availability of US 
assets cannot be taken for granted to further fill European gaps. 
Thus, NATO is deluding itself. It is not as capable as it pretends 
with the new formations because there is a high risk that they 
are just empty shells or exist at the expense of other formations 
but eventually add little to the toolbox. It is in the best-case 
window dressing, in the worst case careless and risky: Allied 
governments and publics might believe that there is defence 
capacity to act, but eventually, there is far too little of it.
 
Sustaining capabilities: how the FNC is squaring the 
capability – formation cycle
Aware of this dynamic, Germany in 2014 proposed the 
Framework Nations Concept (FNC). Since then, the FNC has 
turned into a fashionable concept to revitalise European 
defence cooperation. It aims to preserve European capa-
bilities through sustained cooperation, thereby guarantee-
ing the continued capacity to act for European militaries. 
The development of multinational units would, in theory, 
increase sustainability and help preserve military key capa-
bilities. Smaller armies could plug their remaining capa-
bilities into an organizational backbone provided by a larger 
“framework” nation. Politically, the concept represents a 
step towards transatlantic burden sharing.
FNC 1.0: niche capabilities
The FNC’s initial idea focused especially on niche capabili-
ties. Accordingly, European states should form clusters, that 
is – groups of smaller and larger states that will henceforth 
coordinate more closely who will provide which assets and 
troops on a long-term basis. The “Framework Nation” takes 
the lead of such a cluster. It will provide the group with the 
military backbone, i.e. logistics, command and control, etc. 
Into this frame, smaller nations would plug their specialized 
capabilities, such as air defence or engineer units. Thus, the 
entire cluster would become more effective and sustainable, 
that is, capable of carrying out longer and more complex 
operations. Further, not every nation would have to provide 
- and pay for – everything; thus, more money would be avail-
able to procure what the group needs. The various individual 
clusters together could then provide a more coherent capa-
bility package.
Since 2015, the FNC-nations3  have begun setting up clusters 
for several capabilities, such as air defence or maritime patrol 
aircraft. Yet, results in terms of usable multinational capabili-
ties are still to come. An initial operating capability is expected 
for most projects around 2017. This also points to the long 
timelines of such projects – they do not offer a quick fix.
FNC 2.0: towards larger formations
The changing security landscape is also affecting the FNC. 
The Russian invasion of Crimea has brought back deterrence 
and defence as core tasks for NATO. In practice, this means 
that NATO needs both larger command structures and the 
capabilities that larger formations like Divisions offer – about 
10.000 soldiers. However, 20 years of crisis management 
have pushed Allied command and force structures into the 
opposite direction: The current standard formation is the 
much smaller brigade, about 3500-5000 soldiers. 
Allies cannot switch back from crisis management to defence 
over night. Yet, they desperately need a driver to transform their 
forces. Therefore, the idea is to use the cluster approach of the 
FNC also as an approach to larger structures: Groups of states 
should not only deliver individual and smaller multinational 
capability packages; they should now strive to form a whole 
formation of the size of a division on a multinational basis.
With the reconsideration of such defence forces, planners 
also have to think beyond rapid response forces like the 
VJTF. While these are deterrence tools, real defence forces 
are needed on top of it. Here, the division is turning into the 
new brigade: the brigade has evolved over the last 25 years 
as the core formation for defence. Its size and capability set 
best meets the demands of expeditionary operations. It is 
3  Belgium, Bulgaria Denmark, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Nor-
way, Poland, Romania, Slovakia.
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the smallest unit capable of combined armed operations, 
i.e. able to integrate different types of units. However, espe-
cially for scenarios that involve large conventional confron-
tation, Brigades are not sufficient. This type of “Major Joint 
Operations” (MJO) will demand corps size forces, including 
naval and air assets in significant numbers. Hence, larger 
follow on forces like Divisions and Corps have to be reor-
ganized and equipped. 
The division is envisaged to become NATO’s new working 
horse. But these divisions can hardly be found among FNC 
national armed forces: only Germany and Poland offer rel-
evant HQ structures and have organized forces in the way 
of a division. While NATO can offer a fair number of Corps 
level HQs, supplying divisions is up to the allies. 
Hence, Divisions have to be generated multinationally. The 
starting point will be existing military structures: Germany 
considers offering two of its divisions as a framework to 
start the building of multinational formations and there is 
hope that Poland offers its divisional structures as well to 
establish a multinational formation. These backbones shall 
then be filled with contributions by other FNC-nations.
Remaining Challenges: political sustainability and 
military capabilities
This all sounds like a logical and technocratic task. However, 
it is highly political. The main challenge is the gap between 
ambition and capability. While many nations have begun to 
accept a German lead on the FNC, they seek visibility within 
the formation as a “junior partner”. Moreover, national 
sensitivities vis-à-vis individual partners are a risk to coop-
eration – this has been the case for the Visegràd countries. 
The same is true for government changes. Eventually, those 
nations that are not in favour of such multinational endeav-
ours might see the shift from small multinational niches 
to larger multinational formations with caution: It renders 
their dependence and their loss of sovereignty visible. 
As promising as it is, the FNC alone cannot solve the prob-
lem. Allied armed forces have to be ready, as a whole, to 
conduct 360 degrees of the mission spectrum. As a rule of 
thumb, 80% of capabilities needed for allied defence are the 
same or similar to what is needed for expeditionary opera-
tions. And even allied defence would start for most allies 
with an expeditionary operation into the theatre of opera-
tion. However, the biggest gaps are within this 80% spec-
trum of what is essential for every operation: Command & 
control, intelligence, surveillance reconnaissance, and lift.
The other 20% are mission specific like military police and 
riot control but also classical frontline capabilities. Yet, 
even for the 20% specific capabilities the money is lacking: 
Germany for example significantly reduced heavy armour 
platforms due to its conceptual shift towards stabilization 
operations.
This is aggravated by the fact that ever more capabilities 
reach a limit, in terms of numbers, below which they will 
have no military impact whatsoever. One even has to assume 
that the benchmark for militarily relevant sizes of a capabil-
ity has increased due to the shift from brigade to division 
levels - and then also sustainability and redundancy count.
 
The agenda after the Warsaw Summit
Fancy formations have always been NATO’s political and 
military boosters. However, they do only half the trick 
towards military power. Thus, after the political boost of the 
Warsaw summit, NATO allies and especially the FNC part-
ners have to go back to their homework: Adapting capabili-
ties to the new realities. 
Towards an FNC 3.0
This is especially true for the implementation of the FNC. 
Germany cannot do it alone: Not only does the FNC need 
partners. A look into the raw size and setup of the FNC 
countries reveals the limits of possible sets of larger forma-
tions. Thus, the FNC may have to reach beyond the current 
partners in NATO, especially when it comes to command 
structures, i.e. Britain and France. For geostrategic reasons, 
participation could also be offered to Finland and Sweden. 
Honour smart input – Punish useless output
Doing more means spending more. Public money will remain 
a scarce resource in most allied countries. Against the current 
mainstream impression, there is no clear sign of a substan-
tial change in spending trends. Particularly, governments 
should stop their traditional habit of poor spending, which 
was aggravated by the habit to spend without consulting 
other allies: Spending more thus implies spending smarter, 
i.e. on the right things, and in a coordinated manner.
While allies have agreed on capability priorities, these have 
not prevented existing gaps and redundancies – because 
many governments have ignored these priorities. There-
fore, a top ten list of contributors to capabilities may help to 
give political incentives for better organised output: Such a 
list would indicate which ten allies offer highest contribu-
tions to one or the other capability. This could help allies 
to identify areas where they can be among the top ten con-
tributors and thus matter to NATO and allies politically and 
militarily. It also helps to find areas where their capabilities 
do not matter at all.
Defence planning: Finding a new balance
A new balance is necessary between two axes: The capabil-
ity vs. threat based planning; and the planning for the last 
or the next war. After the end of the Cold War, NATO allies 
have shifted from threat based and formation based plan-
ning towards capability based planning. This has been the 
answer to the change from a clearly identifiable threat into 
a more diffuse environment, where risks and threats are 
the drivers and nations had to prepare against the whole 
bandwidth of scenarios. Therefore, the answer was to not 
have the best capabilities for all threats but a bandwidth of 
capabilities that allows sufficient answers across the whole 
spectrum. Also, less attention was given to heavy capabili-
ties or categories like sustainability and survivability.
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Now it seems that the pendulum is swinging back towards 
a more threat based and formation based defence plan-
ning. Yet, there is a risk of overemphasizing one risk and 
underestimating other parallel developments and the time 
it needs to adapt current forces to new formations. Dur-
ing this transformation time, also the Russian threat will 
have transformed into something different and maybe new 
threats emerge that demand other capabilities. Hence, the 
challenge for NATO nations and their defence planning 
process (NDPP) is to arrive at a good mix of capability based 
and formation based approaches. While the current empha-
sis on structures is important to reach a new equilibrium, 
armed forces should not prepare for the last war. The 80% 
of capabilities that can be used in both scenarios – allied 
defence and crisis management - need to be spearheaded by 
mission specific packages for crisis management or defence.
Develop the FNC’s industrial dimension
To keep military capabilities available and ready, defence 
needs an industrial base. Ensuring capabilities among part-
ners thus also has industrial implications. The FNC can be 
extended into the defence industrial domain. Lead nations 
could have a responsibility to offer partners access to and 
support from the defence industrial base. The FNC thus 
should be extended to defence industrial and procurement 
cooperation. This would also answer the question of how 
to keep an efficient defence industry and which areas are 
of interest to the governments. In the case of Germany, FNC 
partners are asking precisely this question.
Create a common baseline: a defence sector review
Sustaining or even growing capabilities via cooperation 
would imply taking defence planning to a multinational 
level, especially for FNC nations. Partners would have to 
plan in a more detailed, reliable, and coordinated way. 
However, neither the militaries nor political leaders want 
to publicly acknowledge the scale of mutual dependence 
among partners.
A more successful, more integrated defence planning starts 
with European allies knowing the realities of their own 
defence sector. Such a baseline for realistic defence strate-
gies can result from a European Defence Review 2030. 
This would offer governments a candid assessment of what 
is available today and in 15 years’ time, both in terms of 
capabilities and industrial base. It would provide a more 
systematic base for the future work on European defence 
and could spur a debate about developments from a truly 
allied perspective. The description of gaps and duplications 
would enable the development of well-grounded sugges-
tions to identify future areas of cooperation. As the growing 
interdependencies among allies’ security and defence poli-
cies will also become visible, questions about efficient and 
legitimate ways to organize these political interdependencies 
can be discussed. Public debate can pave the way for a strong 
mandate for more defence cooperation and joint planning. 
An independent commission should conduct such a review, 
in order to keep the process political but limit the influence 
of daily domestic politics.
All this is not only a technical but also a political challenge: 
Not ministries of defence but governments as a whole have 
to recognise that defence matters. They cannot live up to the 
new challenges and the promises made in Wales, and prob-
ably in Warsaw, without giving defence a new and higher-
recognition. And spending more requires public support. 
Governments and their militaries also have to overcome the 
prevailing nationalism in this field: Gaining the capability to 
act and thus credibility as a defence actor will not come as a 
result of doing things at home and alone. Indeed, there is a 
long and difficult way ahead, in which the Warsaw summit is 
just a brief pause.
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